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 Nancy B. Rapoport† 
Reviewing 
MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON 
GOOD: PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
(Yale University Press 2009) 
E ARE LIVING IN INTERESTING TIMES. As the econ-
omy worsens and traditional sources of revenue 
dry up, businesses everywhere are scrounging for 
ways to stay afloat. Higher education isn’t im-
mune from these fiscal pressures. At most universities, tuition con-
tinues to rise geometrically,1 and presidents face increased pressure 
to keep costs down and increase efficiency. Many universities are 
using higher ratios of adjunct faculty to tenured and tenure-track 
                                                                                                
† Nancy Rapoport is the Gordon Silver Professor of Law at the William S. Boyd School of 
Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Copyright © Nancy B. Rapoport 2009. All rights 
reserved. Professor Rapoport has just published, with co-editors Jeffrey D. Van Niel and 
Bala G. Dharan, ENRON AND OTHER CORPORATE FIASCOS: THE CORPORATE SCANDAL 
READER, 2D (Foundation Press 2009). 
1 See The $50K Club: 58 Private Colleges Pass a Pricing Milestone, CHRON. HIGHER ED., 
Nov. 1, 2009, available at chronicle.com/article/The-50K-Club-58-Private/ 
48989/ (58 private colleges are charging $50,000 for tuition, room, and board 
this year, up from five such colleges the year before); cf. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Geometric_progression.  
W 
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faculty than ever before, and various constituencies are clamoring 
for better measures of student outcomes to capture whether an 
educational institution is, in fact, educating its students.2 
Into these interesting times returns the traditional debate about 
whether tenure continues to make sense.3 In the “real world,” peo-
ple are losing their jobs left and right – so why should professors 
have a lifetime guarantee of job security? Linked to tenure, of 
course, is the concept of academic freedom. According to the 
American Association of University Professors’ classic 1940 State-
ment of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure,4  
Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common 
good and not to further the interest of either the individual 
teacher or the institution as a whole. The common good de-
pends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition.  
Academic freedom is essential to these purposes and applies 
to both teaching and research. Freedom in research is funda-
mental to the advancement of truth. Academic freedom in its 
teaching aspect is fundamental for the protection of the rights 
of the teacher in teaching and of the student to freedom in 
learning. It carries with it duties correlative with rights.  
Tenure is a means to certain ends; specifically: (1) freedom 
of teaching and research and of extramural activities, and (2) a 
sufficient degree of economic security to make the profession 
attractive to men and women of ability. Freedom and eco-
nomic security, hence, tenure, are indispensable to the success 
of an institution in fulfilling its obligations to its students and to 
society.5 
                                                                                                
2 See, e.g., Commission appointed by Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings, A 
Test of Leadership[:] Charting the Future of U.S. Higher Education, available at www. 
ed.gov/about/bdscomm/list/hiedfuture/reports/final-report.pdf; cf. AAUP 
Statement on Spellings Commission Report, available at www.aaup.org/AAUP/GR/ 
federal/FutureofHigherEd/spellrep.htm.  
3 See, e.g., Roger Bowen, A Faustian Bargain for Higher Education, CHRON. HIGHER 
ED., Oct. 3, 2008, available at chronicle.com/article/A-Faustian-Bargain-for-
Acad/8041/.  
4 Available at www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/contents/1940state-
ment.htm [hereinafter 1940 Statement of Principles]. 
5 Id. (footnotes omitted).  
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Finkin and Post’s book, For the Common Good, provides a valuable 
exposition of the development of academic freedom in the United 
States. Tracing the history of academic freedom from its roots in 
German higher education to the modern-day version,6 the authors 
note a key distinction between the governance of German universi-
ties – governed by the faculty itself – and the early American uni-
versities, which were governed more like other businesses, with a 
president chosen by a board composed of non-professors.7  
That difference in governance was more than mere window-
dressing. For universities governed by non-professors, the govern-
ing board could consider the entire faculty to be employees, not 
management; therefore, the decisions about what those employees 
could research and teach would be left to the president, not to the 
faculty-employees themselves. Such an allocation of duties would, 
of course, be anathema to the modern American university faculty.  
As academic freedom developed in the United States, then,  
American professors sought a version of academic freedom 
that reflected the influence of “a stronger social and consti-
tutional commitment to the idea of freedom of speech,” as 
well as a more pragmatic commitment to the social utility 
of professional scholarship. But these differences [from the 
German model], critical as they are, should not obscure the 
essential fact that the American vision of academic free-
dom, like the German akademische Freiheit, derives almost 
entirely from an understanding of the vocation of scholar-
ship.8  
We don’t talk much about the vocation of scholarship – that 
driving force that causes professors to research and to disseminate 
their research. For that matter, we don’t talk about what drives 
people to work in academia, rather than in the private sector. Pri-
vate-sector researchers perform many of the same functions that 
                                                                                                
6 MATTHEW W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, FOR THE COMMON GOOD: PRINCIPLES 
OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM 23 (Yale University Press 2009) [hereinafter 
COMMON GOOD]. 
7 Id. at 24-25.  
8 Id. at 30 (footnote omitted).  
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professors do (and often get paid much more, to boot). But the dif-
ference between private-sector researchers and academic research-
ers is that the latter have the ability to set their own research agen-
das, separate and apart from the interests of the entity issuing their 
paychecks. It is that separation of salary from research agenda that 
sets academics apart from private-sector researchers and, in turn, 
creates a strange breed of “employee.” 
Faculty members are not “employees” of the university in the 
same sense that other university workers are “employees” (or that 
private-sector researchers are “employees”). Faculty members look 
like employees, to be sure: they get paid by the university; they 
have certain responsibilities in terms of teaching, research, and 
service; they have workspace allocated to them by the university.9 
But Finkin and Post argue that faculty members have duties that 
extend beyond a particular university to the larger obligation of 
academics generally.10 As they explain, 
The core principle of American academic freedom may be 
found in this remarkable passage [from the 1915 Declaration 
of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure]. It ar-
gues that faculty are not “employees” answerable to the will 
of their employers but instead “appointees” responsible “to 
                                                                                                
9 To those who argue that faculty members are employees because of the similari-
ties they have to other university employees, and who tend to use the hoary old 
saw, “if it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, and swims like a duck, it’s a 
duck,” I have to respond: if someone dresses like a surgeon and carries a scalpel, 
that doesn’t reassure me that the person is necessarily a surgeon. Before that 
person sliced into me, I’d want a little more proof. Cf. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Duck_test (describing the origins of the “duck test”).  
10 My dad was a private-sector research scientist for his entire career, and he’s 
happy to note that he, too, believed that he had a duty to conduct research that 
was honest and capable of being replicated. To the extent that Finkin and Post are 
trying to separate private-sector researchers from academic ones on the grounds 
that the latter have some special duty to their profession, they might be painting 
too broad a picture. All researchers have a responsibility to their profession. I 
think that the distinction really is between for-profit research and not-for-profit 
research (even though some academics can make quite a good living with the 
results of their research).  
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the wider public” for the fulfillment of the social function of 
universities. The 1915 Declaration justifies the transforma-
tion of faculty from employees to appointees on the basis of 
two key conceptual premises. The first concerns the pur-
pose of the university as an institution; the second concerns 
the professional expertise of faculty. . . . 
Because faculty are professional experts trained in the 
mastery of these disciplinary practices [that enable the ac-
quisition of knowledge], they are “appointed” to discharge 
the essential university function of producing knowledge. 
In this task they are answerable to the public at large rather 
than to the particular desires of employers.11  
It’s not the nature of research itself, then, that makes academics 
more than mere employees. It’s the nature of universities, where 
the academics work, that give academics that “employee-plus” char-
acteristic. If professors are not actually “appointees” for a greater 
good, then at least they’re something more than mere cogs in a re-
search-producing machine.12 Finkin and Post link academic freedom 
to the raison d’être of the academy itself. 
One of the most useful parts of the book debunks the traditional 
argument that academic freedom in the U.S. is unnecessary because 
of the overarching protection of the First Amendment’s guarantee 
of freedom of speech. Finkin and Post develop a credible argument 
that freedom of speech is too broad a notion to supplant the concept 
of academic freedom.  
Freedom of speech allows anyone to say anything – even stupid 
and wrongheaded things, even outrageous things – free from gov-
ernment censorship. Academic freedom, on the other hand, carries 
                                                                                                
11 COMMON GOOD at 34-35 (footnote omitted). Of course, I’ve always wondered 
if – assuming that faculty members are “answerable to the public at large” – there 
could be something akin to a shareholders’ derivative suit against faculty mem-
bers whose research is scanty, fraudulent, or flat-out wrong.  
12 My dad tells the story of a friend of his who wanted to research something that 
the company wasn’t interested in having him research. Because that friend in-
sisted on pursuing his own research goals, rather than the company’s research 
goals, he was eventually laid off. The ability to pursue one’s own goals, rather 
than one’s employer’s goals, is the hallmark of academia. 
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constraints borne from the strictures of professional disciplines. 
This point is important: too many academics assume that academic 
freedom provides them the right to say anything, at any time, or to 
do anything, at any time. Far from it: 
Academic freedom, therefore, does not protect the auton-
omy of professors to pursue their own individual work free 
from all university restraints. Instead academic freedom es-
tablishes the liberty necessary to advance knowledge, which 
is the liberty to practice the scholarly profession. This point 
is fundamental. Although the First Amendment may pro-
hibit the state from penalizing the New York Times for mis-
understanding the distinction between astronomy and as-
trology, no astronomy professor can insulate himself or 
herself from the adverse consequences of such a conflation. 
If the First Amendment protects the interests of individual 
persons to speak as they wish, academic freedom protects 
the interests of society in having a professoriate that can ac-
complish its mission. The Declaration advances a theory of 
academic freedom that invokes “not the absolute freedom 
of utterance of the individual scholar, but the absolute free-
dom of thought, of inquiry, of discussion and of teaching, 
of the academic profession.13 
Oh, do I wish I had been armed with this understanding of aca-
demic freedom when a professor once told me that no dean could 
ever tell him what to do. He was correct in terms of understanding 
                                                                                                
13 Id. at 39 (footnote omitted). The 1940 Statement of Principles is equally clear. The 
first point under the heading “Academic Freedom” states that “[t]eachers are enti-
tled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the 
adequate performance of their other academic duties.” 1940 Statement of Principles, 
supra n. 4. The second point, under the same heading, provides a limit on what 
professors can teach: “[t]eachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in dis-
cussing their subject, but they should be careful not to introduce into their teaching 
controversial matter which has no relation to their subject.” Id. (emphasis added). Un-
like freedom of speech, then, academic freedom is a relational freedom: faculty 
members are free to explore and to teach that in which they have particular ex-
pertise, but their freedom has limits that relate to their expertise and to the pub-
lic trust that they enjoy as faculty members.  
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that no dean could choose his body of research for him14 or dictate 
how he taught his courses; but he was woefully misinformed when 
he argued that deans couldn’t tell him to do anything at all. Aca-
demic freedom has never protected the dereliction of duty. It is a 
tradeoff: the freedom to inquire and to explain as a tradeoff for the 
privilege of being engaged in the academy as a professional 
scholar.15  
For the Common Good takes us through the history of the devel-
opment of academic freedom to the understanding of the principles 
of freedom of research and freedom of teaching, while illustrating 
the necessity of academic freedom with some key examples.16 The 
                                                                                                
14 I took this component of academic freedom to heart when, during my sabbatical 
year after stepping down as dean, the Provost wanted the interim dean to dictate 
what my research agenda should be. Had the Provost really tried to push the 
issue, I would have relied on the 1940 Statement of Principles (and the wonderful 
lawyer who represented me at the time) to fight back. 
15  The tradition of academic freedom, with its twin commitments to freedom of re-
search and to compliance with professional norms, nicely balances these negative and 
affirmative dimensions. This balance would be lost if academic freedom were refor-
mulated as an individual right that insulates scholars from professional regulation. Re-
formulated in this way, academic freedom would regard the communication of each 
scholar as equally protected and thus enforce the premise, explicit within First 
Amendment doctrine, that there is an “equality of status in the field of ideas.” It is 
clear that this premise is inconsistent with the advancement of knowledge, which re-
quires precisely that ideas be treated unequally, that they be assessed and weighed, ac-
cepted and rejected. The kind of individual freedom that underlies the structure of 
First Amendment rights is for this reason ill-suited to the production of knowledge. It 
instead expresses the postulate of equal, intrinsic, individual dignity that lies at the 
foundation of legitimacy in a democratic state. 
COMMON GOOD, supra n. 6, at 43 (footnotes omitted).  
16 One of my favorite passages in the book details the claims of “hostile educational 
environment” that various pundits have lobbed at higher education: 
The idea of a “hostile environment” derives from anti-discrimination law. Employers 
violate the civil rights of employees if they permit the workplace to become a hostile 
environment for women or minorities. Critics of higher education wish to appropriate 
this idea and apply it to the context of university teaching. As with the ideal of “bal-
ance,” there is a sense in which the idea is appropriately deployed. Professional ethics 
require faculty to “demonstrate respect for students” and to avoid “any exploitation, 
harassment, or discriminatory treatment.” Freedom of teaching would thus not pro-
tect a professor from disciplinary action if he were to harass, ridicule, or discriminate 
against students for their political or religious beliefs. 
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strength of this book – and it is a superb book – lies in the cogency 
of its arguments and the lyricism of its prose. What’s not to love, 
for example, about a passage that explains how tricky it is to distin-
guish an expansion of knowledge that differs from accepted canons 
of belief from the quackery of a sham scholar? 
The difficulty is that independence of thought and utterance 
cannot be so easily cabined. Critical inquiry can turn on the 
very framework of “accepted intellectual standards” that is 
supposed to distinguish true knowledge from false belief. 
An individual scholar can always claim that he or she is de-
veloping new and different intellectual standards, and this 
claim can be justified on the incontestable ground that such 
standards are themselves forms of knowledge that must be 
open to critique and development. We are thus led to a 
paradox. Intellectual standards are required to connect the 
exercise of academic freedom to the production of knowl-
edge, yet intellectual standards are also themselves forms of 
knowledge whose evaluation requires academic freedom. 
Academic freedom thus appears to be dependent on, yet 
independent of, intellectual standards. 
This paradox lies coiled at the core of the traditional 
justification for freedom of research and publication.17 
                                                                                                
It is important, however, to distinguish between respect for persons and respect for 
ideas. Faculty must respect students as persons, but they needn’t respect ideas, even 
ideas held by students. In higher education no idea is immune from potentially scath-
ing criticism. If a student identifies with his own ideas, he might well experience ruth-
less critique of those ideas as a personal assault. But it is precisely the pedagogical pur-
pose of higher education to introduce critical distance between students and their own 
ideas. 
Id. at 105 (footnote omitted). We’ve developed a generation of emotionally frag-
ile students who not only are uncomfortable with professors who challenge their 
deeply held ideas but who also cannot seem to understand that universities are 
not supposed to invite to campus only those speakers with whom the students 
agree. Academic freedom protects faculty members who challenge students’ 
ideas (as well as the ideas of their own colleagues), so that teachers can eventually 
demonstrate that the best response to a poorly developed thought isn’t censorship 
or avoidance; it’s debunking the idea through analysis and debate.  
17 Id. at 54.  
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And with that paradox lies the rub:18 when academic freedom 
intersects with the governance of a university, how do we distin-
guish those arenas that should clearly be within the prerogative of 
the faculty from those arenas in which the expertise of the faculty 
adds little, if anything, to the debate? I speak, of course, of the issue 
of shared governance.19  
Academic freedom addresses the parameters within which a pro-
fessional scholar may use his or her training to pursue “the free 
search for truth and its free exposition.”20 The reason that, as a part 
of university governance, academic departments – and not “the ad-
ministration” – should set and enforce their own standards regard-
ing hiring, promotion, and tenure, and to set their own curricula 
and admissions standards, is that the academic departments are in 
the best position to know quality from mediocrity (or worse). Ad-
ministrators who do not come from an academic discipline just 
don’t have the bona fides to be entrusted with the ability to tell 
wheat from chaff.  
The problem, however, is that not all academic departments can 
be entrusted to tell wheat from chaff, either. I’ve seen two different 
problems with giving academic departments jurisdiction over even 
those activities particularly within their purview. First, because the 
establishment of high academic standards only works when a de-
partment pursues those standards, academic departments that are 
less than purely motivated can engage in a race to the bottom. 
(Think of those departments that refrain from hiring candidates 
with “better” resumes than those of the current faculty, because the 
department doesn’t want to “show up” its current members.) Lazi-
ness or insecurity can easily pervade a dysfunctional department, 
and dysfunctional departments will tolerate shoddy research, poor 
teaching, and a complete failure to perform the basic professorial 
                                                                                                
18 Cf. William Shakespeare, HAMLET, Act III, Scene 1, available at www.online-
literature.com/shakespeare/hamlet/9/.  
19 For a nice discussion of shared governance, see Gary A. Olson, Exactly What Is 
‘Shared Governance’?, CHRON. HIGHER ED., July 23, 2009, available at chroni-
cle.com/article/Exactly-What-Is-Shared-Gov/47065/.  
20 1940 Statement of Principles, supra n. 4.  
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functions. Post-tenure review policies in dysfunctional departments 
are completely toothless, as long as they depend on the depart-
ment’s faculty to enforce any standards.21 The faculty that shucks 
responsibility together will decline together. I’ve seen it happen.22  
The second failure of shared governance occurs because there is 
no clear line of demarcation between purely academic areas and 
those issues of governance more commonly left to the administra-
tion – e.g., budget issues, issues of allocation of space or other re-
sources, and issues of compliance with the myriad regulations that 
every university faces. The lines of authority not only blur but be-
come tangled, sometimes irretrievably. 
I’ve had the benefit of seeing these blurred lines at four different 
institutions: as a faculty member at all four and as an administrator 
at three out of those four. For example, when Tropical Storm Alli-
son wiped out a significant portion of the University of Houston 
Law Center in the summer of 2001, most of the professors were 
away from Houston. The school somehow had to figure out how to 
function during those summer months and during the renovation 
and repair of the facilities afterwards. Thanks to some dedicated 
staffers, we had email up and running even though we had only lim-
ited access to our buildings, no electricity or phone service, and 
significant damage caused by fourteen feet of water coursing 
through our facilities. That email functionality let the administration 
run some “faculty decisions” by the faculty: for example, should we 
require laptops, given that our library had been wiped out? But the 
issue of whether the faculty or the administration had jurisdiction 
                                                                                                
21 And don’t get me started on detenurization. One almost has to be willing to kill a 
trustee to face detenurization. 
22 I’ve been at one institution that prevented the dean from putting a professor into 
a post-tenure review rehabilitative program, even when that professor taught 
poorly, hadn’t published in years, and performed very little service. Post-tenure 
review at that institution required a faculty vote, and that faculty refused to vote 
to put any of its members into a rehabilitative program, on the “there but for the 
grace of God go I” theory. No professor was willing to pull the trigger on nonfea-
sance, so the end result of the faculty’s refusal was that the most productive 
members of the faculty bore a disproportionate share of the school’s work. 
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over particular decisions bogged down other pressing issues. What 
should we do about redesigning a building that had lost one-and-a-
half usable floors?23 How could we teach law students without a 
functioning library?24 What if we couldn’t rehab the facilities before 
classes resumed in the fall?25 How could we run a functioning school 
during the summer without any functioning buildings?26 
Faculty decision-making tends to move at glacial speed for pre-
cisely the reason that people become professors: the need to con-
sider all aspects of a question before deciding what to do about it. 
My favorite provost27 used to remind deans that what made faculty 
members so good – the ability to focus on an issue and see all sides 
of a question – could occasionally make them very frustrating when 
decisions had to be made posthaste. Moreover, faculty members are 
extremely smart people, as a rule. They assume that they know, or 
can learn, all about an issue so as to be able to talk intelligently 
about it. The corollary to that assumption is that, because faculty 
members are quick studies, they believe that they can opine intelli-
gently, say, about budgets and facilities and other decisions that tra-
ditionally fall within the jurisdiction of administrators.  
                                                                                                
23 Answer: we formed a committee composed of faculty and administration to 
redesign the space. 
24 Answer: because we’d already installed a wireless system before Tropical Storm 
Allison, we were able to give students access to research tools electronically – 
hence, the laptop requirement. 
25 Answer: we worried about this issue every single day between the end of the 
storm and the beginning of classes. Every single day. Thanks, however, to the 
generosity of our community and the willingness of our summer-school faculty to 
teach off campus, we taught summer school in law firm conference rooms and 
professors’ homes, missing only one week of classes because of the storm. 
26 Answer: the university moved our “offices” to the basketball arena. Our account-
ing and other functions were in the luxury boxes, which weren’t particularly 
luxurious. Our career services office was based in a concession stand. (The af-
termath of the disruption of Career Services was the largest cause of the school’s 
U.S. News ranking dip a few years later. One lesson that I learned is that Career 
Services is one of the top three functions that a dean should preserve during a 
crisis, right behind payroll and communications.) 
27 My favorite provost worked at the University of Nebraska. 
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Perhaps it’s true that those blurred lines of shared governance 
would benefit from more faculty input. Nothing prevents an English 
professor or an economist or a nuclear physicist from learning about 
a university’s budget or deferred maintenance schedule and then 
providing the administration with wise counsel about holes in the 
budget or where best to spend building repair funds. But the prob-
lem with most blurred areas of shared governance is that the faculty 
often wants to provide input without knowing all of the facts – an 
activity that no professor should tolerate in his or her own research 
area but which often occurs in, say, departmental or faculty senate 
discussions. There’s just no SparkNotes version of budgets and space 
allocation decisions for faculty members to use. There’s no good 
way to study these types of issues superficially and be able to under-
stand how all of the moving parts work together; and yet I’ve seen 
too many professors insist on giving the type of input that bears no 
relationship to administrative reality – and then insist that the ad-
ministrators follow that input to the letter. 
Moreover, once professors venture beyond their legitimate areas 
of responsibility – beyond furthering their discipline’s research, 
teaching their students, admitting new students, and hiring new 
faculty members – the real problem of shared governance is the lack 
of shared consequences for actions. If a faculty sets a budget and 
then overspends it, the faculty members don’t get fired; but the 
administrators might. If a faculty allocates portions of a building to 
particular activities and the allocation doesn’t “work” for all of the 
department’s constituencies, the faculty doesn’t get called on the 
carpet;28 the department chair or dean does. If a faculty votes to cut 
the size of the entering class or eliminate a program beloved by the 
alumni, the faculty suffers no consequences (at least not directly),29 
but the department chair or dean certainly does.  
Ultimately, the problem with shared governance is that a good 
working model of governance includes both clear hierarchies and 
                                                                                                
28 No pun intended. Really. 
29 Eventually, of course, the budget or donations may suffer. 
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consequences for irresponsible actions.30 Shared governance in uni-
versities has neither. The administrators in universities have a clear 
hierarchy that (mostly) fits consequences to decisions (eventually). 
But the hierarchy of faculty is fairly flat. Deans and chairs are “first 
among equals,” with very little power to force professors to do 
their bidding. There’s really not much that an administrator can do 
to a tenured faculty member who isn’t pulling his weight, even in 
these financially difficult times.  
Really, the whole point of academic freedom is that it should be 
tied to the responsibility of serving a good that’s larger than the in-
dividual professor’s needs. Academic freedom, especially as Finkin 
and Post explain it, is inexorably linked to the highest goals of the 
academy: it’s freedom of inquiry, not freedom from professional 
standards or job duties. Academic freedom is like any great power: 




                                                                                                
30 Want to see evidence of why consequences for irresponsible actions are impor-
tant? Check out the bailout. See, e.g., David Stout, The Wall Street Bailout Plan, 
Explained, NEW YORK TIMES, September 20, 2009, available at www.nytimes. 
com/2008/09/21/business/21qanda.html.  
31 SPIDER-MAN (Columbia Pictures 2002) (www.imdb.com/title/tt0145487/ 
quotes).  
